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Abstract
In this article, I expand upon a happy coincidence (for scholars) in reconciling the
overlap between contract and fraud. Both the recent book by Ian Ayres and Gregory
Klass and the Delaware Court of Chancery in Abry Partners Acquisition V, L.P. v. F& W
Acquisition, LLC addressed the issue of promissory fraud – the making of a contract as to
which the promisor had no intention of performing. Each treatment, however, in
focusing on fraudulent affirmative representations, falls short of (a) recognizing the
fundamental aspect of deceptive promising in a complex deal, namely the half-truth, (b)
articulating an appropriate doctrinal principle to address it, or (c) capturing the social and
linguistic context that makes the deceptive half-truth so insidious.
The archetypal facts in Abry frame the issue. When the parties to a business
acquisition agreement purport to limit the buyer’s reliance to those representations and
warranties set forth in the agreement, just what obligations of truth-telling have the
parties contractually released? We need to grapple with the inter-relationship of law,
language, mutual understanding, and trust. The language of the law (and the contract) is
a blunt instrument by which to map to track the subtle fine lines of a complex agreement.
I will contend that there is a kind of special arrogance in the illusion onto which lawyers
hold – that the uncertainties and contingencies of the world are in their power to be
controlled, and to the winner of the battle of words go the spoils. The correct doctrinal
result is to presume in the transactional speech acts (including the contract), as we do in
everyday life, a default of truth-telling, to permit the parties freely to contract around the
rule, but to require narrow construction of the exceptions and disclaimers.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
The parties to sophisticated business acquisitions use a number of methods to

assure themselves of an appropriate allocation of risk. Sellers provide buyers an
opportunity for due diligence; buyers undertake their own investigation apart from the
resources made available by sellers; the parties adjust the price to reflect risks; and the
parties use the language of contracts seemingly to provide a final statement of the rights
and obligations of one to the other. Yet those methods do not wholly dispose of postagreement disputes. Whether a matter of opportunism or a matter of interpretation (or
one disguised as the other), buyers still sue sellers, even where each is sophisticated and
relied on expert legal, accounting, operational, and transactional counsel.
The line in our jurisprudence between contract law and tort law becomes all the
more visible where these same sophisticated parties attempt to use the language of
contract to set the bounds of the seller’s obligation to share information. Combined with
contractual language limiting the seller’s liability for breaches of covenants, warranties,
and representation, there can be an intended or unintended over-inclusiveness. Did the
parties intend, or should they be presumed to have intended, to have those provisions
limit seller’s liability for intentional misrepresentation of the state of the business?
There have been two recent and highly sophisticated treatments on the question of
promissory fraud, one academic and one judicial, in recent months. Ian Ayres and
Gregory Klass have published Insincere Promises: The Law of Misrepresented Intent.1
The authors seek to fill the gap into which the cause of action for promissory fraud falls –
being something beyond the scope of the contract law syllabus, but something not
1

IAN AYRES & GREGORY KLASS, INSINCERE PROMISES: THE LAW OF MISREPRESENTED INTENT (2006).
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addressed in the torts class. Their subject is the relationship between liability for the nonperformance of a promise, and the liability where not only was the promise not
performed, but the promisor never intended to perform from the outset. The proposed
legal approach recognizes the complexity (and non-reducibility) of the world. Law
ultimately is neither natural nor social science, and cannot be reduced to algorithms. It is
instead a social structure in which we come to agree that certain actions, even as between
private parties, are worthy of sanction through the legal process. As a reflection of an
“anti-reductionist approach to the theory of promising – which refuses to pack every
aspect of the transaction into the duty to perform,”2 Ayres and Klass argue for the
retention in the law of a doctrine by which the making of a promise without the intention
to perform is separately actionable under the law of fraud.
In Abry Partners V, L.P. v. F&W Acquisition, LLC,3 Vice-Chancellor Leo Strine
of the Delaware Court of Chancery found himself presiding over a real-world allegation
of promissory fraud. The issue was whether the fairly typical indemnity cap and
exclusive remedy clause in a business acquisition agreement barred an extra-contractual
fraud remedy where the allegation was the seller knew one of the contractual
representations to be false. The court held that the parties intended to limit liability even
for deliberate falsehood, but such limitation was not enforceable as a matter of public
policy in Delaware. The immediate academic reaction centered on whether one can
disclaim the obligation to tell the truth, with the general consensus being: yes, it is a dogeat-dog formalistic world out there. Professor Larry Ribstein criticized the opinion along

2

3

Id. at 204.
891 A.2d 1032 (Del. Ch. 2006).

2

those lines on his blog.4 Professor Frank Snyder suggested, in the same vein, that
sophisticated parties, having agreed to this kind of disclaimer, should be obliged to
provide an explicit provision if they want to be protected against lying.5
These are admirable advances in consideration this area of the law, which
heretofore has received scant treatment.6 But each, in my view, tantalizes but falls short
in different ways, but each in truncating the inquiry, perhaps by oversimplifying the
problem presented. The common focus of the book and the case are the legal
implications of a speech act that falsely represents something known to the speaker; in
the book, that information is the speaker’s undisclosed intention not to perform the
promise, and in the case, it is the speaker’s failure to disclose the true condition of the
business. I believe Ayres and Klass have gotten closer to the essence of the problem –
the implicit warranties in the very use of language. But each treatment sees lying merely
as a false statement, and the art of deception is far more nuanced.
The publication of the book and the issuance of the Abry opinion are a happy
coincidence. The facts presented in Abry – the deal, the contract, the due diligence, even
the shenanigans that provoked the post-closing lawsuit – are an archetype. Its appeal as
grist for the scholarly mill lies not in its idiosyncrasy but in its very typicality. Moreover,
the very wealth and sophistication of both parties create a kind of jurisprudential
laboratory to examine the intersection of fraud and contract.

And finally, the case raises

fundamental theoretical issues about a subtle truth-telling understanding among those
who negotiate complex deals, and whether the power of language can be harnessed to
4

Larry E. Ribstein, Should a Court Enforce a Contract That Permits Lying, IDEOBLOG, available at
http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2006/02/should_a_court_.html.
5
See comment of Frank Snyder to Contracting to Lie, supra note 1.
6
AYRES & KLASS, supra note 1, at 6. The authors provide an extensive bibliography supporting this
assertion at note 20.
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reflect it. Each treatment, however, in focusing on fraudulent affirmative representations,
falls short of (a) recognizing the fundamental aspect of deceptive promising in a complex
deal, namely the half-truth, (b) articulating an appropriate doctrinal principle to address
it, or (c) capturing the social and linguistic context that makes the deceptive half-truth so
insidious.
If anything, this decision issued by a thoughtful and scholarly judge in a
universally recognized business-friendly forum is evidence of how lawyers and judges
can be seduced or even blinded by what they think is a lawyer’s unique power over
language. So, while I agree with the result, I will suggest, as a matter of doctrine, there is
a rule of law that maps more precisely on the common understanding of participants in
complex acquisitions, as well as the way in which all of us, including sophisticated deal
negotiators, ordinarily expect language to be used. Moreover, while I think Ayres and
Klass have captured the spirit of my thesis here, it is necessary to expand on their
thinking to address fully the issues presented in Abry.
My project here is not merely to state a better doctrine by which courts should
reconcile freedom of contract and the law of fraud. As Ayres and Klass correctly
observe, “[p]hilosophers find it endlessly fascinating that by the mere act of uttering
certain words one can create a duty for oneself. Legal thinkers are faced with the more
pressing practical problem of whether, why, and how the law should take cognizance of
such duties.”7 Having criticized Vice-Chancellor Strine’s holding, I am obliged to state
my proposed doctrinal result. And I will suggest, as a matter of efficiency enhancing

7

Id., at 2.
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doctrine that it follows wholly within the information-forcing default rule analysis
proposed by Ayres and Klass.8
But I wish to take up the philosophical inquiry left largely untouched by those
scholars. This archetypal case unpeels like an artichoke, invoking, ultimately, the interrelationship of law, language, mutual understanding, and trust. The language of the law
is inadequate – a blunt instrument – by which to map track the fine lines of a complex
agreement, and that requires us to go beyond the law to the psychology and philosophy of
language itself. I will contend that there is a kind of special arrogance in the illusion onto
which lawyers hold – that the uncertainties and contingencies of the world are in their
power to be controlled, and to the winner of the battle of words go the spoils.
Vice-Chancellor Strine tried admirably to reconcile the polarities of the policy of
promoting freedom of contract versus the law's adoption of a moral code (don't lie) in the
law of fraud. But, it seems to me, he got lost somewhere in that illusion of the power of
language, and found himself required to resort to the deus ex machina of public policy to
cure what seemed to him, nevertheless, an injustice. But his solution was flawed
precisely because it is a continuation of the problem: giving too much credit to the
lawyers’ ability to capture the affirmative essence of the deal in the contract language,
and seeing the contract as the embodiment rather than a reflection of the deal. It is a kind
of formalism, a “four corners” approach that fails to capture the underlying texture of the
promise and its context.
That is because the law of contracts as applied here (like the Ayres and Klass
analysis of misrepresented intent) only deals with affirmative misrepresentations (and
reliance thereon), and does not capture that implicit context of the deal by which the
8

Id., at 83-112.
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parties also understand that there is some duty that has been created more akin to what in
the law of fraud is omission or half-truth.9 And, indeed, the essence of this case was not
promissory fraud, but half-truth and omission. The contract never addressed omissions,
nor, as Vice-Chancellor Strine conceded, did it ever explicitly disclaim the right of
rescission on account of either intra-contractual or extra-contractual misrepresentation.
My doctrinal result is easy to state. Where, as in Abry, the parties have
disclaimed reliance on extra-contractual representations, freedom of contract requires that
the provision be given its precise effect. The disclaimer should only be effective in the
instances either (a) where the extra-contractual representation conflicts with the
contractual representation, or (b) where the contract is wholly on the subject matter of the
extra-contractual representation. A disclaimer of reliance on extra-contractual
representations cannot and should not be deemed to impact the half-truth or omission
liability that may well be the natural consequence of having made the contractual
representation. Moreover, the burden should be on the party asserting the anti-reliance
clause to show that it was intended to cover anything but liability arising wholly as a
result of the falsity of extra-contractual representations.10

9

In fairness, the general recognition of this idea constitutes the great advancement in INSINCERE PROMISES.
The book is worth the investment of time if for nothing more than this passage:
But representations of intent are also tools that promisors use to
accomplish very specific tasks. Promising is a complex joint
intentional activity and involves a high degree of both coordination and
trust between the parties. In most cases, it takes more than the
performative force of the promissory act (the creation of an obligation
to do the act promised) to secure those obligations.
AYRES & KLASS, supra note 1, at 203.
10
There is one extensive academic treatment of contractual disclaimers of liability for fraud. Kevin Davis,
Licensing Lies: Merger Clauses, the Parol Evidence Rule and Pre-Contractual Misrepresentations, 33
VAL. U. L. REV. 485 (1999). Vice-Chancellor Strine cited it in a footnote. 891 A.2d at 1058 n. 56.
Professor Davis’ focus was somewhat different from mine. He too examined the impact of typical merger
or integration clauses that would have the effect, if applied literally, of exculpating a party from fraudulent
or grossly negligent statements made outside the bounds of the contract in pre-contract negotiations. But
the thrust of his analysis was the interplay of contract and agency law, and he concluded that whether to

6

What, I suspect, is more controversial is my reason for advocating this rule. In
the effort to credit freedom of contract and efficiency, I think the court and commentators
are saying that sophisticated deal parties must (or do) assume that everything is a lie
unless it is affirmatively warranted in the contract. I believe that reverses the natural
import of language among human beings, lawyers and judges included. Our very use of
language carries with it a presumption of truth-telling, and that presumption is not
overcome simply because lawyers are writing contracts in their own variant of the same
language. It is possible to write a contract provision that wholly and expressly disclaims
any obligation of truth telling or avoidance of half-truth deception. But that almost never
happens. Instead, the law of fraud, combined with the pleadings requirements of
particularity, provides a truth-telling safety net. This is, in the end, I suspect a broader
remedy than rational actor theorists or contract formalists might want, but one that I think
more accurately maps on the fine line of the understanding among the lawyers and clients
in the hothouse atmosphere of an intense merger or acquisition negotiation.
In Part II, I will describe the Abry opinion, primary because it reflects an
archetypal deal from which generalization is possible. Part III is a critique of the doctrine
analysis, and proposes a doctrinal alternative. In Part IV, I justify the alternative through
an efficiency analysis akin to that proposed by Ayres and Klass. But I also take up a
enforce the disclaimer might turn on whether the party seeking to enforce the disclaimer was a natural
person who was the perpetrator of the fraud, or an enterprise seeking to protect itself from its own overzealous agents. Davis, supra, at 533-34.
My project is different: to focus particularly on the limits of the ability to disclaim truth-telling among
sophisticated parties. But Professor Davis’ introductory quotation from Joel Feinberg captures my opening
empirical intuition:
Not even in the business world -- that one area of social life where the
"battle of wits" competitive-game model is most persuasive, and people
match the shrewdness of their judgments and the cleverness of their
stratagems for getting the better of one another -- not even here do
rivals voluntarily assume the risk that the other party to an agreement is
an outright liar, getting the better of one by plain deceit.
3 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO SELF 285 (1984).
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subject wholly unaddressed in the court’s opinion, and alluded to but not unpacked in
Insincere Promises: the reasons why, as a matter of the psychology and philosophy of
language (drawing on Wittgenstein and Habermas), as well as the place the law sits in
relation to everyday life (drawing on the work of Austin Sarat and Thomas Kearns), the
language of contract cannot fully map on the complexity of the world, and why as a result
we ought to continue to credit in the law the warranties of truthfulness inherent in
language through a presumption that the remedy for half-truth fraud exists unless
expressly and clearly disclaimed.
II.

THE CASE
The facts of the case reflect the usual complexity and multiplicity of parties in

private equity acquisitions, but the core allegations underlying the legal issue are
relatively simple. I am going to spend some pages describing the facts, because
ultimately I will turn to theory, and grounding it in these archetypal circumstances of a
dispute will be helpful in bridging theory and the real world.
A.

The Context of Private Equity

Private equity firms are generally in the business of buying and selling target
companies, with the idea that the original cost to purchase, plus any additional
investment, will be less than the proceeds upon resale of the company to a so-called
strategic buyer, another private equity firm, or to the public in an initial public offering.11
Valuation of companies for purposes of mergers and acquisition players is an art
and science. Although finance theory says that the value of a company is always equal to
the present value of its future cash streams, the fact that the exercise is a prediction

11

JOSH LERNER, VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE EQUITY (2000), at .

8

necessitates the use of estimates and heuristics.12 The particular heuristic in the
publishing business was that publishing companies should sell for ten times a financial
calculation called EBITDA, earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and
amortization.13 EBITDA is often used as a surrogate for operating cash flow,14 and the
applying a multiplier is an easy rule of thumb that incorporates risk and relative
profitability of an industry.
B.

The Deal
1.

The Set-up

Providence Equity Partners (“Sellers” or “S”) was a private equity firm. S had
purchased a company called F&W Publishing (“Target”), which was in the book and
magazine publication and distribution business. At a certain point, it decided it wanted
to sell Target and embarked on the usual merger and acquisition deal process. S
controlled the process, but it was Target’s management, who had no previous affiliation
with S, that knew the ins and outs of the company.15 S announced publicly that it would
sell Target through an auction conducted by Credit Suisse First Boston (“CSFB”), an
investment banking firm, which began contacting and meeting potential buyers.16
Although the case does not say so explicitly, there can be little doubt that CSFB
coordinated due diligence: plant tours, document rooms, management presentations,
financial records for potential buyers.
2.

The Buyer and the Contract

12

Id., at 161-201.
891 A.2d at 1038.
14
“EBITDA,” Investorwords.com, available at http://www.investorwords.com/1632/EBITDA.html.
15
Id., at 1037.
16
Id., at 1038.
13
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Abry Partners (“Buyer” or “B”) was one of the suitors for Target. It participated
in the usual due diligence. In parallel, it entered into contract negotiations with S. The
typically lengthy acquisition agreement had six critical provisions.
•

In the main body of the agreement, Target, and not S, made the contractual
representations and warranties about the condition of Target’s business. But the
agreement also required S to certify to the accuracy of the representations and
warranties in the contract, which had the effect of making S a direct obligor on
those provision.17

•

As is customary, Seller warranted that the financial statements fairly represented
the financial condition of Target in all material respects. 18

•

There were two variants of relatively common provisions under which the buyer
disclaims any reliance other than on the representations and warranties set forth in
the agreement.19

17

891 A.2d at 1043. Vice-Chancellor Strine focuses on the distinction between the primary source of the
representations, Target itself, versus the later provision in the agreement whereby S agreed “to put its
wallet behind the Company’s representations and warranties to a defined extent.” I think his purpose was
to show the closely-negotiated nature of S’s contractual obligation, but, for my purposes, I do not see a
significant point in the way the deal was structured. S was bound to the representations and warranties as
thoroughly as if it had made them in the first instance.
18
The financial representation stated:
The Company Financial Statements: (i) are derived from and reflect, in
all material respects, the books and records of the Company and the
Company Subsidiaries; (ii) fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition of the Company and the Company Subsidiaries at
the dates therein indicated and the results of operations for the periods
therein specified; and (iii) have been prepared in accordance with
GAAP applied on a basis consistent with prior periods except, with
respect to the unaudited Company Financial Statements, for any
absence of required footnotes and subject to the Company's customary
year-end adjustments.
891 A.2d at 1041-42.
19
Section 3.23 of the contract stated:
EXCEPT AS EXPRESSLY SET FORTH IN THIS ARTICLE III, THE
COMPANY MAKES NO REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY,
EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, AT LAW OR IN EQUITY IN RESPECT
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•

The indemnity provision provided that S would be liable for damages that “...
have arisen out of or ... have resulted from, in connection with, or by virtue of the
facts or circumstances (i) which constitute an inaccuracy, misrepresentation,
breach of, default in, or failure to perform any of the representations, warranties
or covenants given or made by the Company or the Selling Stockholder in this
Agreement.”20

•

But S’s obligation to indemnify was to be limited to a $20 million indemnity fund
that was to be “the sole and exclusive remedies of the Acquiror, the Acquiror
Indemnified Persons, the Selling Stockholder, and the Company with respect to
this Agreement and the Sale contemplated hereby. . . .”21

OF THE COMPANY OR THE COMPANY SUBSIDIARIES, OR
ANY OF THEIR RESPECTIVE ASSETS, LIABILITIES OR
OPERATIONS, INCLUDING WITH RESPECT TO
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR
PURPOSE, AND ANY SUCH OTHER REPRESENTATIONS OR
WARRANTIES ARE HEREBY EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMED.
ACQUIROR HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGES AND AGREES THAT,
EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT SPECIFICALLY SET FORTH IN THIS
ARTICLE III, THE ACQUIROR IS ACQUIRING THE COMPANY
ON AN "AS IS, WHERE IS" BASIS. THE DISCLOSURE OF ANY
MATTER OR ITEM IN ANY SCHEDULE HERETO SHALL NOT
BE DEEMED TO CONSTITUTE AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
THAT ANY SUCH MATTER IS REQUIRED TO BE DISCLOSED.
Id., at 1042. In addition, Section 7.8 provided:
Acquiror acknowledges and agrees that neither the Company nor the
Selling Stockholder has made any representation or warranty,
expressed or implied, as to the Company or any Company Subsidiary
or as to the accuracy or completeness of any information regarding the
Company or any Company Subsidiary furnished or made available to
Acquiror and its representatives, except as expressly set forth in this
Agreement . . . and neither the Company nor the Selling Stockholder
shall have or be subject to any liability to Acquiror or any other Person
resulting from the distribution to Acquiror, or Acquiror's use of or
reliance on, any such information or any information, documents or
material made available to Acquiror in any "data rooms," "virtual data
rooms," management presentations or in any other form in expectation
of, or in connection with, the transactions contemplated hereby.
Id., at 1041.
20
Id., at 1044.
21
Id. The exclusive remedy provision did permit a claim for specific performance and injunctive relief if S
or Target failed to comply with the contractual covenants.
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The upshot was that B purchased Target for $500 million, but limited itself to $20
million in damages for breach of contract.
3.

The Shenanigans

As is typical in the sale of portfolio companies by private equity firms, not only
did S’s management direct the sale process, but it set the financial parameters and
expectation for the sale. What is critical here is the allegation that S had already
determined it wanted to derive a purchase price for Target in excess of $500 million,
necessitating, given the industry value heuristic, that the financial statement show
EBITDA of at least $50 million.22 B alleged, ultimately, that S had undertaken at least
four different deceptive manipulations and non-disclosures to support the purchase price:
(1) overstating its revenues through a practice known as “backstarting,”23 (2)
underestimating reserves for book returns and uncollectible accounts,24 (3) “stuffing the
channel,”25 and (4) misrepresenting the implementation of an order entry system.26
C.

The Denouement and the Claim

22

Id.
One of the attractive features of a subscription-based business is that the firm takes in cash before it has
to perform. To over-simplify, if a subscriber pays $300 for a three-year subscription, under generally
accepted accounting principles, the cash received may be counted in cash flow statements, but it may not be
called revenue for income statement purposes until the company earns it by sending out a magazine. The
allegation here was that S caused Target to inflate its revenues by sending back issues of the magazines
upon subscription, and counting those as earned. Id.
24
Book return reserves are a cost on the income statement. If the company deliberately underestimates
them, it will show higher earnings.
25
“Channel stuffing” may or may not be a misstatement of the financial statements themselves, although B
alleged this as another way in which book returns were underestimated. Even in the absence of a
contemplated sale, a company may try to increase its reported earnings in a given period by offering terms
to customers that make it attractive to buy in current rather than future reporting periods. As an example,
management may perceive that fourth quarter earnings are going to fall short, and will offer discounts or
extended payment terms. Even with such discounts or terms, if the products are shipped before the end of
the period, they may be counted legitimately as sales revenue. Often, however, there is an adverse impact
on revenue in the next quarter, because customers have all they need. Where the business is being sold as
of the end of such a reporting period, a buyer may take the revenue numbers for the current period as
indicative of annualized sales, and discover only after closing that the practice caused them to be inflated.
Id. at 1039.
26
Id., at 1039-40.
23
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After the closing, B discovered the various shenanigans, and concluded that it had
paid $500 million for a business that was fairly worth $400 million.27 B claimed that S
and the management of Target had together manipulated Target’s financial statements to
induce B to buy Target at an excessively high price. Accordingly, B alleged not only
that the usual financial representations and warranties in the agreement were false, but
that S had defrauded B by knowingly making false representation within the contract and
outside of the contract in the course of due diligence.
No doubt frustrated by the $20 million damage cap it negotiated on a $500 million
purchase, B sought rescission of the agreement based on fraud and misrepresentation. S
moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, contending (1) B had disclaimed any
reliance on extra-contractual representations, and (2) B had agreed the only remedy it had
against S for misrepresentation was limited to a claim in arbitration that was capped to
the extent of the $20 million indemnity fund. B argued the language of the agreement did
not limit its remedial options, and that in any event, public policy should override any
attempt to limit liability for misrepresentation.
Vice Chancellor Strine concluded: (i) misrepresentations lying outside the
contract are non-actionable (because of the negotiated disclaimer of reliance); (ii) the
contract language contemplated the exclusive and capped “indemnity pool” as covering
liability for fraud as well as contract misrepresentation; and (iii) a well-pled (i.e. with
particularity) claim sounding in fraud based on contract representations known to be false
and intentionally made still lies.
III.

THE CRITIQUE
A.

27

The Doctrinal Critique

Id., at 1040.
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1.

The Source of the Problem

I begin with a doctrinal critique. The opinion went awry, I believe, because the
anti-reliance provision, and Vice-Chancellor Strine’s powerful reaction to it, blinded him
to the fundamental nature of the alleged wrong. To understand this, we need to unpack
just what happened here.
First, Vice Chancellor Strine came to the conclusion, purely as a matter of
contract interpretation, that the parties actually agreed to insulate S from the legal
consequence of outright lying, because of the wording of the indemnity clause. S agreed
to be liable for “an inaccuracy, misrepresentation, breach of, default in, or failure to
perform, any of the representations, warranties or covenants” both with respect to the
agreement and the sale contemplated thereby.28 B contended that the word
“misrepresentation” as used in an acquisition agreement means innocent
misrepresentations (as might arise if warranties and covenants turn out to be inaccurate)
that appear in the agreement itself. Indeed, that is the point of the other disclaimer of
extra-contractual representations: B was not to be permitted to substitute an extracontractual representation for one found in the agreement. Nevertheless, Vice-Chancellor
Strine concluded that the term “misrepresentation” must have meant both
misrepresentation within the agreement as well as those related to the sale but which did
not constitute contractual representations. Moreover, he concluded that the ordinary
meaning of “misrepresentation” included both innocent and deliberate
misrepresentations.29 Combined with the contractual limitation on damages, he inferred

28

Id., at 1053 nn. 40-41.
I have real doubts, both empirically and as a theoretical matter, whether this was the correct conclusion.
If, as a matter of interpretation, we consider the most likely hypothetical bargain, it seems to me highly
unlikely that the parties intended to give a free pass for promissory fraud. Had the judge interpreted

29

14

that the parties intended to give S a free pass on outright lying – promissory fraud – to the
extent the financial impact of the lies exceeded $20 million. Second, because it seemed
there was something amiss in this result, Vice-Chancellor Strine resorted to public policy
to hold that the fraud remedy (and rescission) would be available, notwithstanding the
apparent disclaimer.
It is absolutely clear that Vice-Chancellor Strine had no sympathy for the apparent
opportunism implicit in B’s resort to the fraud remedy. “The teaching of this court . . . is
that a party cannot promise, in a clear integration clause of a negotiated agreement, that it
will not rely on promises and representations outside of the agreement and then shirk its
own bargain in favor of a ‘but we did rely on those other representations’ fraudulent
inducement claim.”30 Indeed, the judge castigates B as a liar:
To fail to enforce non-reliance clauses is not to promote a
public policy against lying. Rather, it is to excuse a lie
made by one contracting party in writing -- the lie that it
was relying only on contractual representations and that no
other representations had been made -- to enable it to prove
that another party lied orally or in a writing outside the
contract's four corners. For the plaintiff in such a situation
to prove its fraudulent inducement claim, it proves itself not
only a liar, but a liar in the most inexcusable of commercial
circumstances: in a freely negotiated written contract. Put
colloquially, this is necessarily a "Double Liar" scenario.
To allow the buyer to prevail on its claim is to sanction its
own fraudulent conduct.31
The doctrinal irony is here is that the case is not really about conflicting
representations, some inside the contract and some not. Nor, as is typically the case in
disputes of this kind, is it about the clear agreement of the B not to rely on puffing or

“misrepresentation” as advocated by B, the motion to dismiss would have been resolved there without
resort to public policy. I will return to this interpretive issue later.
30
Id., at 1057.
31
Id. at 1058.
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even false statements made in the context of the complex process that is the investigation
and negotiation of a business acquisition. If we consider a representation to be like a
promise, then like Ayres and Klass or Vice-Chancellor Strine, we will focus on the
representing party’s intention to carry through on the representation or promise. And the
natural focus of the disclaimer will be on the negation of an affirmative: the buyer did
not rely on the representation or promise in going forward with the deal.
But that is not what happened here. The opinion goes astray with the focus on
representations, as opposed to the other two ways fraud can arise: omissions and halftruths. If we merely focus on representations, the distinction between intra-contractual
representations and extra-contract representations is simple because the counter-promise
from the buyer is that he/she did not rely.32 But how do you disclaim an omission?
Omission liability arises when there is a duty to disclose and one fails to do so. So the
contract would have to disclaim the duty of disclosure. The language would read
something like: “our understanding is this sale is ‘as-is where is, with all faults,’” or “if I
said something that was a lie, you have no remedy.” In short, that is the doctrine of
caveat emptor. But we do not really find that level of disclaimer in an acquisition
agreement. (I have tried to write a provision that disclaims omission liability, and it is
almost impossible to write, short of saying "I have the right to lie to you, and you cannot
do anything about it.") We do allow due diligence, there is an expectation that you will
not withhold data, and it seems to me that the fraud remedy for extra-contractual
omissions is the only backstop to deal with that.

32

Id., at 1057.
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So that brings us to the half-truth liability Vice-Chancellor Strine never addresses.
Half-truth liability is based on the duty to disclose the whole truth if you make a halftruth representation.33 It is a hybrid of affirmative misrepresentation and omission.34
Donald Langevoort asked “Why do we have law barring affirmative misrepresentation in
the first place? Why don’t we say that reasonable people should always do their own
“due diligence” investigation rather than rely on information provided by someone with
an obviously conflicting?”35 His answer is the one we would expect: we reduce
transaction costs by having the knowledgeable party to disclose rather than have the
uninformed party investigate.36 Langevoort observed, crucially, (a) that the same
economic logic applies to half-truths,37 and (b) that it is a continuum from
misrepresentation to half-truth to non-disclosure. 38
Almost all nondisclosure cases arise in bargaining settings
where there is indeed much said between the parties.
Under these circumstances, what the court is being asked to
do is determine what inferences the buyer can fairly draw
from the seller’s statements and omissions. Here the
buyer’s inferences may be more extensive – there is more
interpretive work going on – but the difference is only in
degree.39
Even though there are circumstances in which we may believe the informed party retains
a privilege not to disclose, “the [party’s] willingness to speak on the subject assuages our
concern about forcing disclosure of private information, causing us to move the line
33

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§529, 551(2)(b)(1977).
See Junius Const. Co. v. Cohen, 257 N.Y. 393, 178 N.E. 672 (1931) (Cardozo, J.) (“We do not say that
the seller was under a duty to mention the projected streets at all. That question is not here. What we say is
merely this, that having undertaken or professed to mention them, he could not fairly stop halfway, listing
those that were unimportant and keeping silent as to the others.”) [additional cases on half-truth liability]
35
Donald C. Langevoort, Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken Inferences by Investors and Others, 52 STAN.
L. REV. 87, 94 (1999).
36
Id.
37
Id., at 94-95.
38
Id., at 96.
39
Id.
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toward disclosure duty even where there is some lingering ambiguity as to the extent of
the implication.”40
Professor Langevoort’s continuum, it seems to me, subsumes the entire distinction
between intra-contractual and extra-contractual representations Vice-Chancellor Strine
was trying to make. Or to put it another way, buyer’s disclaimer of reliance on an
affirmative representation does NOT disclaim the "omission"-style liability that ought to
arise if seller tells a half-truth. What makes these facts difficult (and interesting) is an
underlying sense that courts ought not to be troubled with fraud claims as between
sophisticated parties (who have the ability to ask the pertinent questions), regardless of
reliance or non-reliance on anything outside the contract.41
2.

A Doctrinal Alternative

Were I to decide the case, and I would have reached the same result as ViceChancellor Strine, but on a wholly different basis. As a result, there would have been no
need to get to the public policy issue, and the holding would, I contend, be a default rule
for anti-reliance clause that maps far better onto the most likely hypothetical bargain of
the parties. In Sections 3.2 and 7.8 of the agreement, S did everything that most sellers
do to focus the attention of the buyer on the express representations of the agreement, and
to disclaim anything that falls outside of the agreement.42 But it did not disclaim the duty
to tell the whole truth if it told part of the truth. All S did was to say that its duty-creating
affirmative statement were those in the contract, not those made outside the contract.
40

Id., at 97.
See Grumman Allied Indus. Inc. v. Rohr Indus. Inc., 748 F.2d 729, 737 (2d Cir. 1984).
42
The “as-is, where-is” clause is interesting because sellers might argue that it negates any duty of truthtelling other than as set forth expressly in the agreement. But because my doctrinal argument is that the
assertion of any representations creates the possibility of half-truth liability, the only really effective “as-is,
where is” clause would be one in which the contract contains not a single affirmative statement about the
condition of the business. And, as we know, that almost never happens!
41
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I would have given effect to the anti-reliance provisions in a more precise way:
The disclaimer should only be effective in the instances
either (a) where the extra-contractual representation
conflicts with the contractual representation, or (b) where
the contract is wholly on the subject matter of the extracontractual representation. A disclaimer of reliance on
extra-contractual representations cannot and should not be
deemed to impact the half-truth or omission liability that
may well be the natural consequence of having made the
contractual representation. Moreover, the burden should be
on the party asserting the anti-reliance clause to show that it
was intended to cover anything but liability arising wholly
as a result of the falsity of extra-contractual representations.
But to justify this result, I need to turn to theory.
B.

The Theoretical Critique
1.

Restating the Problem

I propose to make the theoretical problem simpler by using hypothetical
provisions. In Appendix A, I have proposed a series of hypotheticals demonstrating the
increasing complexity of the misrepresentations, half-truths, and omissions that the nonreliance clause would perhaps be intended or construed to cover. For purposes of the
text, I will focus on three, Cases 2, 3, and 7. In each case, the contract provides: “There
are no, and Buyer disclaims any reliance on, representations or warranties, except
those expressly made in the contract.”
Case 2: The contract is silent on the subject of unionization of facilities. A
high-ranking officer of seller states during a management presentation says that Company
A does not have any unionized facilities. It turns out the company does have a unionized
facility. In this case, I would give effect to the anti-reliance clause. By its silence on the
subject, the contract created an implicit conflict between the external and internal
representations. There were no representations about unionized facilities within the
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contract on which Buyer could rely per its own agreement, and the provision exculpates
Seller.
Case 3: The contract states that the company does not have any unionized
facilities. There are no other extra-contractual representations, but the same high-ranking
officer of the company knows that the workers at more than one plant have approved the
formation of a union, but the union election has not yet been certified by the National
Labor Relations Board, and so technically the company still does not have any unionized
facilities.
Here, the outcome will depend on the interpretation of the word “unionized.”
Was it intended to include an approved but uncertified union as well as established
unions? That is unclear. If it is absolutely clear to all concerned that “unionized
facilities” does not include one in which the union has been approved but the election has
not been certified by the NLRB, then there can be no fraud, because there is no untrue
statement. But what is the relationship of scienter to the ambiguity of the original
representation? The example demonstrates the possibility of a half-truth, even in what
would have seemed at the outset to be a simple and clear affirmative representation. A
laissez-faire or purely contractual approach would place the burden on the buyer to obtain
the correct information by asking the correct question, or to create express liability by the
prospective elimination of any possible ambiguity.
Case 7: The contract states that the company’s financial statements fairly
present in all material respects the financial condition of Company on the dates and
for the periods presented in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles consistently applied. As in Abry, the company booked “return reserves.”
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The standard for “return reserves” under GAAP is that they must be based on a
reasonable estimate of expected returns. The chief financial officer issued a
memorandum to all business unit controllers indicating that it was important for the
purpose of the impending sale of the company that all return reserves be in accordance
with GAAP, but nevertheless to err on the side of low estimates rather than high
estimates. This had the effect of making the earnings look higher. Sellers deliberately
did not disclose this memorandum in due diligence. Presumably the court in Abry would
hold the otherwise actionable facts to be beyond the scope of the contract due to the
disclaimer. I would conclude that the original representation was an assurance that seller
is not playing games and telling half-truths outside the contract. Hence, the
representation itself created a duty of full disclosure, whether inside or outside the
contract. And I would not find an extra-contractual remedy to be troubling. If the seller
failed to tell the whole truth within the contract, why should the buyer be limited to the
remedy inside the contract? 43
2.

An Efficiency Critique

We begin with a efficiency analysis, not so much because I believe that is the only
reason for my rule, but because the role of the law in promoting efficient business
transactions was important to Vice-Chancellor Strine. The notions of predictability and
43

I also propose a somewhat simpler hypothetical that I think raises the same half-truth issue as in Case 7
of the Appendix. Seller and Buyer write a contract for the sale of a car. The sale is “as-is, where-is” except
that the Seller represents and warrants that the tires were replaced at 40,000 miles. The contract contains
the following clause: “There are no, and Buyer disclaims any reliance on, representations and warranties,
except those expressly made in the contract.” Buyer discovers after purchasing the car that the tires were
not replaced because of ordinary wear and tear, but because the car had been in an accident that had caused
the tires to be destroyed. A reasonable inspection of the car did not reveal any other indication of an
accident. Buyer would not have bought the car had it known of the accident.
Does Buyer have a claim for fraud? It is undisputed that Buyer has an affirmative right to rely on the
tire representation. I will also assume for the sake of the discussion that, in the absence of the tire
representation, B would have no rights vis-à-vis the accident. The questions, then, are (a) did the
representation about the tires create a duty to tell the whole truth about the replacement, and (b) did the
disclaimer impact any such duty?
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certainty (as hallmarks of economic efficiency) are mantras in the justification of contract
law. They are also a theme in Delaware’s effort to compete for the application of its
law.44 Indeed, Vice-Chancellor Strine attempts, on one hand, to reconcile Delaware’s
pride in the efficiency of its commercial law,45 against its abhorrence of immunizing
fraud, on the other;46 indeed, citing a single passage from Judge Posner’s seminal text to
support what appears to be an economic justification of the difference between
intentional lying and innocent misrepresentation.47 The primary basis for justifying the
contractual disclaimer of reliance on the truthfulness of assertions is that these provisions,
when used, are efficient, promoting predictability and certainty.
I contend my rule of construction, which would preserve the fraud claim in all but
the clearest cases of broad-based disclaimer, is in fact the most efficient result. A similar
analysis of promissory fraud in Insincere Promises is instructive. As I have noted, the
concerns there are somewhat different from mine. Indeed, I will contend that the choice
of default rule – one that is information-forcing rather than majoritarian (at least in the
first instance – ought to differ when we are talking about the difference between a
descriptive use and a performative use of language. Ayres and Klass would be concerned
about the circumstance where a buyer or seller says “I promise to close on September 30”
with no present intention of performing on the promise. The issue in the archetypal Abrystyle deal is not whether the seller intends to close. That is a given. The question is how
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to interpret a disclaimer of reliance in the face of a statement that x is true about the
business.
So it is helpful to trace through the process by which Ayres and Klass select a
default rule in order to understand the Coaseian parameters at play, and to distinguish the
problem of a secret intention not to perform from the problem whereby a seller says part
but not all of what is true about a business. J.L. Austin’s insight was to identify those
speech acts that are not descriptive of an independent state of reality, that is not capable
of being either true or false, but are themselves the very reality. Examples of
performatives include marriage vows, promises, bequests, and namings. 48 So the issue
for Ayres and Klass is whether the words appearing to create a performative were so
intended as such by the speaker.
But in order to determine whether the promisor intended, at the time of the
promise, to perform, it is first necessary to interpret what the promisor promised.49 Ayres
and Klass lay down a set of interpretive defaults and rules for contracting around them,
and those rules apply almost wholesale to the disclaimer problem.
Ayres and Klass do not advocate the elimination of the parties’ ability “to choose
what to say or not to say about their intentions, about the probability of their
performance, and about whether they think it in the promisee’s self-interest to rely.”50
Their only mandatory rule is that “[e]very promise represents at least that the promisor
does not have an intention not to perform.”51 The question then is the appropriate default
rule, around which the parties may choose to negotiate. Such a default could be based
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AYRES & KLASS, supra note 1, at 86.
50
Id., at 89.
51
Id., at 90.
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primarily on “what the majority of contracting parties would choose,” on one hand, or
“information-forcing effects,” on the other (although it is entirely possible that the
majoritarian default has information-forcing effects, or vice versa).52
Ayres and Klass posit that a promise could have default interpretations across a
continuum of meaning about the probability of performance (from definite to positive to
opaque), as well as the promisor’s assurance to the promisee that the promisee should
feel comfortable in relying on the promise (from fully warranting to semi-warranting to
non-warranting). Their conclusion is that performatives that look like promises should be
subject to two default representations, which they call “positive,” which relates to the
promisor’s expectation that it will perform, and “semi-warranting.” In other words, “A’s
statement ‘I promise to x’ should be that A says both that she intends to x and that she
doesn’t believe that the probability of her xing is so low that it is not in the promisee’s
rational self-interest to rely [semi-warranting]. In addition, the default meaning of A’s
saying that she intends to x is that there is at least a 50 percent chance that she will x
[positive].” 53
We should note that Ayres and Klass have not opted for a default rule that would
force the most information. The promise performative can be presumed to be richer or
poorer in information. We can presume that promises “tell the promisee that the
probability of performance is at least some value (definite-probability), that the
probability of performance is so great that the promisee can safely rely on it (warranting),
or that the probability of performance is secured by the promisor’s intention to

52
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Id.
Id., at 99.
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perform.”54 Whether a promise is construed to include a warranty about the promisee’s
level of reliance, it requires the promisor to gather information about the promisee.
Ayres and Klass conclude that while “if our only concern were to maximize information
disclosure, the best interpretive default would be that a promise simpliciter is both
positive and fully-warranting.”55 What this means is that if the promisor thought the
likelihood of performance was low enough that the promisee ought not rely on it, the
promisor would be obliged to say so, or be liable for promissory fraud. Because this
would require the promisor to gather information about the promisee’s need or desire to
rely, Ayres and Klass contend that such a default “would not reflect what most promisors
would choose to say with their promises.”56
It is important, however, to distinguish between the proposed default rule as it
relates to the creation of a performative versus the purely descriptive aspects of the
representation. Ayres and Klass think the information costs will be too high, and
therefore sub-optimal for the encouragement of value-creating promises, if a promisor is
presumed to have made full warranties about the promisee’s ability to rely. Yet the
positive default rule on the promisor’s own intent is information-forcing – “absent
contrary circumstances, a promise represents that the promisor intends to perform.”57
A performative is, however, necessarily an affirmative representation. Let us now
consider the Abry issue, in which we seek to set a default rule for the scope of seller’s
representations in the face of the buyer’s disclaimer of any reliance on extra-contractual
matters. The same efficiency-enhancing information-forcing default rule that requires the
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promisor to disclose if she does not intend to perform supports liability, as in Case 3,
where the promisor deceives intentionally by making representations that are only
partially true.
Information-forcing defaults tend to penalize one or both
parties, giving them an incentive to reveal information in
order to opt out of the default. The desirability of an
information-forcing default falls under the heading of
informational effects and is governed by the general
principle that interpretive rules should give parties an
incentive to disclose the optimal amount of information.58
For purposes of stating a default rule, we ought to be able to say, as a matter of common
sense, that it is cheaper for the warrantor than the warrantee to determine whether an
affirmative statement has created a half-truth. It is entirely possible this may not be the
case, but then it is incumbent on the speaker to take some action to provide a warranty
other than the one that creates the half-truth; i.e. to contract around the default rule. To
call the buyer’s statement that it is not relying on extra-contractual representations such
an avoidance of the default rule is to forsake the information-forcing nature of the
acquisition agreement; the exercise becomes a word game.
Moreover, placing the burden of the default rule on the discloser makes sense
intuitively, if we consider the motivations in the sale of a business. This is the classic
prospect theory advanced by Kahneman and Tversky.59 At the closing of a deal, by and
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large, the seller receives present cash against the possibility that the buyer may make a
claim at some time in the future. My casual empiricism is that sellers view a lost sale as
a loss, and weigh that loss far more heavily than the future prospect of liability under an
indemnity clause. Hence, the natural inclination is to minimize problems, not to disclose.
3.

A Linguistic and Social Critique

There is something more than economic incentive at play in setting the default
rule for the fine line between innocent and deliberate misrepresentation and the intra- and
extra-contractual instances of truth telling. Ayres and Klass recall the relatively amoral
Holmesian interpretation of a contract: the promise is either to perform to pay damages
for non-performance.60 What comes through, notwithstanding the law’s primary concern
in commercial matters for consequences, is distaste for the efficient breach, at least when
it was preceded by an intention never to perform. By all accounts, legal, economic, and
moral, we start with a presumption of truth-telling. Vice-Chancellor Strine makes it clear
that the presumption is that even extra-contractual statements carry with them a
presumption of truth-telling upon which fraud could be based, if the parties “do not
clearly state that the parties disclaim reliance upon extra-contractual statements. . . . If
parties fail to include unambiguous anti-reliance language, they will not be able to escape
responsibility for their own fraudulent representations made outside of the agreement’s

reference point, coupled with the special aversion to losses, means that
it matters a great deal whether something is presented as a gain or a
loss relative to the status quo; a perceived threat of a loss relative to the
status quo weighs more heavily than a perceived threat of foregoing a
gain.
Id. at 1535-36.
AYRES & KLASS, supra note 1, at 4-5. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L.
REV. 457 (1897), reprinted in 110 HARV. L. REV. 991, 996 (1997) (“the duty to keep a contract at common
law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it, - and nothing else).
60
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four corners.”61 But if it is a moral concern, it is one grounded not in a duty of truthtelling, but a concern for commercial consequences if lying is permitted. The court’s
rejection of a disclaimer of promissory fraud is primarily based on efficiency grounds:
“there is little support for the notion that it is efficient to exculpate parties when they lie
about the material facts on which a contract is based.”62 Indeed, the supporting footnote
for the preceding sentence is to Judge Posner’s seminal text, in which he simply declares
flatly “[t]he lie is different. The liar makes a positive investment in manufacturing and
disseminating misinformation. This investment is completely wasted from a social
standpoint.”63
And yet, it is not wholly a consequential matter. As Vice-Chancellor Strine
states:
I use the plain word “lie” intentionally because there is a
moral difference between a lie and an unintentional
misrepresentation of fact. This moral difference also
explains many of the cases in the fraus omnia corrumpit
strain, which arose when the concept of fraud was more
typically construed as involving lying, and thus it is
understandable that courts would find it distasteful to
enforce contracts excusing liars for responsibility for the
harm their lies caused.64
I believe there is a reason for this confusion. I am not sure, were Judge Posner to
consider it more deeply, that he would conclude some lies, particularly of the “white lie”
variety, might well be efficient.65
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The issue before is simply how broadly to interpret a disclaimer of truth-telling
when it appears in a contract. Like Vice-Chancellor Strine, I have no particular
compunction against a buyer freely agreeing that it imposes no duties whatsoever upon
the seller to say anything at all, truthful or not about the business. It is certainly possible
to write a provision in an agreement that says: “Buyer is simply buying the business. It
acknowledges the possibility that nothing the Seller has said in the contract is wholly
true, particularly in view of facts or circumstances Seller may have intentionally or
unintentionally failed to disclose, and Buyer hereby absolves Seller of any duty to clarify
what in hindsight may be deemed to have been a half-truth.” So I do not really think that
the question turns on what the law of Delaware might endorse as a matter of moral
philosophy – whether utilitarian efficiency, on one hand, or deontological revulsion
against the telling of lies, on the other. Either might well be the basis for law, but neither
really captures the complex context of a heavily negotiated business acquisition
agreement.
The counter-thesis is that it is a linguistic jungle out there, full of outright lies,
non-disclosures, and half-truths, and the only protection is what one’s lawyer is able to
capture in the four corners of the documents. That counter-thesis is consistent with the
re-emergence in modern contract theory of formalism,66 particularly in complex
transactions, on the presumption that sophisticated business people would prefer that
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approach.67 I suggest instead that the basis for the presumption of truth-telling (and the
concomitant narrow construction of disclaimers of truth-telling) is based in more
fundamental properties of speech acts, and in our everyday expectations of each other.
In the remainder of this article, I want to take a dive into language and social
theory as an alternative basis for having courts presume that the parties (a) did not adopt
the doctrine of caveat emptor, and (b) did undertake the agreement with some
consciousness of the law of fraud. Accordingly, any contract language purporting to
allow, expressly or implicitly, the right to lie should be construed narrowly. A model, or
inspiration, for this project may be Dennis Patterson’s introductory comments to his
attempt to article a general theory of good faith under Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code.68 The problem is interesting because it is, as Professor Patterson
observed of the U.C.C., a concrete problem that nevertheless might be illuminated by
alternative theoretical approaches.69
a.

Presumptions Based on the Use of Language and the
Warranties of Speech Acts
(1)

The Illusion of Power over Interpretation

When we rely on the blunt instrument of language to describe the fine lines of
which statements were relied upon and which were not, absolute predictability and
certainty collapses, and rightly so. Insights from the philosophy of language raise
67
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questions about the parties’ ability fully to capture the agreement in words to a scientific
certainty. The first problem is in the interpretation of the word “misrepresentation.”
P.S. Atiyah, citing Wittgenstein’s “family resemblance” argument, commented on just
this situation:
Too often, the problems which have beset the contract arise
precisely because the parties did not foresee the events
which have occurred, and they did not, therefore, have any
relevant intentions at all. It is true, of course, that a person
may use language intended to cover (or exclude) a general
class of things without necessarily adverting to each known
example: “Someone says to me: ‘shew the children a
game.’ I teach them gaming with a dice, and the other says,
‘I didn't mean that sort of game.’"70
Hence, the issue is not the assiduousness or preparedness or foresight of the lawyers. It is
the problem that language and the law are blunt instruments that are often incapable of
drawing the fine line of the implicit understanding.
The exercise is foremost one of interpretation. “We interpret an utterance when
we choose between different ways of understanding it. Legal interpretation is the activity
of deciding which of several ways of understanding a given provision is the correct or
preferable way of understanding.”71 The target of our interpretive exercise is the
utterance in the contract concerning the agreement to rely only on those representations
and warranties made in the agreement. We need to parse the language of the anti-reliance
clause as linguistic sign. To understand what the parties mean when they recite that the
buyer is relying only on the representations and warranties contained in the agreement,
we must assess it “against the background of public, intersubjective practices.”72 We are
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projecting several concepts – reliance, representations, warranty – onto the reality of a
relationship between the seller and the buyer. The words are part of the “language
game;” as Wittgenstein describes, “the whole, consisting of language and the actions into
which it is woven.”73 Patterson quotes Stanley Cavell’s explanation of the grammar of a
chair. We imagine the concept of a chair. It is not merely something on which we sit. It
is not even something on which we sit that serves all the functions of a chair (a rock
pushed up against a wall may serve as a chair but it is not a chair). “What can serve as a
chair is not a chair, and nothing would (be said to) serve as a chair if there were no (were
nothing we called) (orthodox) chairs.”74
To sweep representations into half-truths or omissions, and to ignore their
differences, is to ignore the grammar of the “reliance.” An omission or half-truth is no
more a representation that something that serves as a chair is a chair. It is somehow
related but it is not the same. We cannot rely on an omission, and to suggest that by
disclaiming reliance on a representation we have somehow impacted omissions is to
ignore, or at least gloss over an important distinction.
This is the trap to which Vice-Chancellor Strine succumbed in his interpretation
of the indemnity clause. If the word “misrepresentation” in the indemnity clause did not
include an intentional misrepresentation, but only the innocent circumstance under which
the facts did not match up to the contractual representation, there would have been no
issue whether Delaware would recognize the right to lie. The problem arose because
Vice-Chancellor Strine took the contractual provision to anticipate outright lying, and, a
fortiori, more subtle forms of deception, like half-truths and palliatives. Here, there is a
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question whether we are even talking the same language; the court turns to the legal
lexicon to define misrepresentation, citing Black’s Law Dictionary, and not to what the
words signify as linguistic signs in the deal context.75 “Someone says to me: ‘Shew the
buyer an indemnity clause protecting him against misrepresentation.’ I include a
contractual indemnity against fraud, and the other says ‘I didn’t mean that kind of
misrepresentation.”
The benefit of contractual representations is that they are a form of strict liability;
all we need determine is if they are untrue (or perhaps materially untrue). It is something
altogether different to indemnify not only against the misrepresentation being untrue, but
also against the state of mind of the speaker at the time the representation was made. The
anti-reliance disclaimer makes perfect sense when applied against strict liability
assertions of the state of the business. But it becomes nonsensical when the purpose of
the assertion was the deception by half-truth, and the essence of the wrong is in what was
not said, and could never have been the subject of reliance.
It is a particular conceit of lawyers (and many lawyer-scholars), however, that
they can obtain control over the world with a unique ability to map language on reality.
Yet, I would contend this is not the case even among lawyers. That there may be a gap
between language and reality is the upshot of thinking in the philosophy of language in
recent years. Benjamin Zipursky has observed:
[W]e now realize that the idea that language represents reality is a myth.
In fact, the languages of various communities are simply tools we use to
get around, to interact, to impose norms on one another, and to carve the
world up as we wish at any point in time. Any particular community at
any particular time is roughly limited by its language and its conceptual
scheme to seeing the world a certain way, but the connection between
language and world is ultimately ineffable. Moreover, even with respect
75
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to individual speakers, the task of interpretation is daunting, and
fundamentally indeterminate. 76
The most articulate response to my thesis – that the contractual disclaimer has to
be construed narrowly – is that contract negotiations among sophisticated parties are a
stylized, ritualized business, and the ordinary use of language defers to the particular
language of lawyers (and I suppose business people) in that particular setting. Indeed,
one responder said that the reason for the writing was to speak to a judge some day if
necessary; hence, even more support for the notions that the only words with meaning
were those expressly set forth, at least in the face of the disclaimer.
The thesis is controversial because it tends to undercut the lawyer's self-image of
value creation, something on which it is difficult to have a balanced perspective if one
always been a lawyer, looking at the world through lawyer's eyes. In particular, one
response to the thesis is that making the language clear and precise is what we do as
lawyers, and why do we bother if that's all for naught? To the contrary, say my
colleagues, we operate in a special community of language technicians, in which the
relative cost-avoiding positions of the receiver of the statement and the maker of the
statement are up for grabs.77
Yet even these language specialists react in ordinary ways when they are the
victims of the close parsing of language. Let us consider a thought experiment in which
every relevant participant is a lawyer and, hence, an equally proficient parser of
language. A lawyer related the story of a witness at an evidentiary hearing on whether to
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lift a temporary restraining order that had been issued in a trademark infringement case.78
The issue was laches – whether the plaintiff had known about the infringement but
nevertheless sat on its rights. The TRO had been issued in part on the basis of an
affidavit of one of plaintiff’s officers that he first became aware of the issue in August.
The cross-examining lawyer learned that the officer had really heard about it back in
February or April but somehow his affidavit (drafted by his lawyer) ended up with the far
more favorable, from a laches perspective, unequivocally false statement that he first
heard about the problem much later.
Assume, for my purposes, that the witness (call him Smith) told his lawyer (call
her Ms. Jones) he heard about the infringement in April, then forgot about it, then
recalled again in August. So his affidavit says "I became aware in August." This
statement is literally true, but it is a half-truth, because what is left out is that Smith also
became aware in April. Assuming plaintiff is chargeable, for laches purposes, with
Smith's earlier becoming aware, it is a significant half-truth.
Ms. Jones has deliberately fudged the truth. In the adversarial setting, is it fair
game to fudge, and then incumbent on Ms. Jones' opponent (call her Ms. Johnson) to
ferret out the full truth? Presumably, Ms. Jones and Ms. Johnson are equally capable of
discerning impreciseness in language that gives rise to the ambiguity that in turn gives
rise to the half-truth (i.e. does "became aware" imply "first became aware")? And
assuming Ms. Johnson misses the trick, the judge is also a lawyer, and is also,
presumably, as capable as either lawyer of discerning that kind of trick.
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So why is everybody so angry (particularly the judge) when it turns out that Ms. Jones
has slicked both Ms. Johnson and him? My thesis is that even sophisticated lawyers
presume the truth of the words in their communicative action, accordingly to a
community standard that is far less precise than lawyers (or economists) would generally
like to think. We have an intuitive reaction, even as sophisticated lawyers, that we have
been wronged in this instance. If we credit my general thesis about default
interpretations as applied to half-truths, we can muster a coherent explanation of the
source of the dilemma. But if, in my thought experiment, I make all the lawyers and
judges fully rational actors in their use of language, there is no accounting for the sense
that something has gone terribly amiss.79
(2)

The Implicit Warranties of Speech

But the issue is not merely interpretation. There are implicit and pre-conscious
warranties in language. That is, we begin with the proposition that we say or seem to be
saying ought to be taken at face value. As noted earlier, the contractual representations
and warranties are merely descriptive and not performative.80 It seems to me those
descriptive utterances have linguistic truth warranties to them that precede any legal
warranties. To put it another way, if the thesis is that every statement in a negotiation is a
potential lie, and can only be given truth content by virtue of the contract, it is only the
contract and not our ordinary language that is communicate. In short, we have reversed
the intuitive use of language.
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We can unpack this by reference to Habermas’s distinction between discourse and
communicative action.81 Habermas focuses on language as the means (and the sole
means) by which we have inter-subjective communicative action. Taking a Kantian
perspective, he intuits an access to universal norms that go beyond mere empiricism. To
Habermas, it is simply counterintuitive to believe the positive science of the physical
world is all there is. Nevertheless, he is unwilling to posit a completely subjective access
to truth, and this insight is derived from the development in philosophy he refers to as the
“linguistic turn.” Following on Wittgenstein, language is how we intermediate between
our selves and our world. Wittgenstein demonstrated (akin to Kant’s deduction that there
is an objective world as to which each subject is observer) that there are no private
languages. That is, if our minds conceive of ideas in a wholly private language, it is
though those ideas did not exist because they cannot be communicated to anyone.
Indeed, language is itself a social structure, and we are assuming too much about our own
raw individuality if we assume we are so alone as to have developed the very medium by
which we express our ideas.
So what is our agreement? When we begin to discuss our individual goals and the
possibility of the attainment of value through mutual understanding and a bargain, we do
so through language, the only means by which such discussion is possible. “Let’s agree
that the price escalates by increases in the cost of living,” says one of us. When we have
a handshake agreement or a preliminary understanding like this, it is still an exercise in
inter-subjective understanding by the intermediation of language. But our lawyers show
us the ways in which that communication might break down. “Did you mean to measure
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that increase by the consumer price index? Or by the wholesale price index? For which
goods and services? And in which geographic areas?”
This provides the lawyer’s analog to Habermas’ discourse ethics. When a speaker
asserts a proposition, and the listener purports to understand it, there are implicitly four
“background” claims being made with respect to the proposition. These are not, in the
ordinary course, at the top of mind (they only become so when there is what Habermas
calls a breakdown in communicative action), but they are a priori aspects of the way we
process each other’s speech (akin to Kant’s categories of the understanding in ordering
the data of the outside world):
•

The proposition is intelligible – the speaker and the listener each understand
something from the proposition – it is syntactically correct and follows the
accepted “internal relation between symbolic expressions and the relevant system
of rules, according to which we can produce these expressions.” “An utterance is
intelligible if it is grammatically and pragmatically well formed, so that everyone
who has mastered the appropriate rule systems is able to generate the same
utterance.” An example is Bertrand Russell’s famous example: The present King
of France is Bald.” The sentence is nonsensical but nevertheless we understand it
syntactically.82

•

As to statements making truth claims, each party recognizes the truth of the
proposition. “Truth is a relation between sentences and the reality about which
we make statements.”
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•

As to statements making normative claims, each party acknowledges the
normative rightness of the norm that the statement may be fulfilling. This is
distinct from truth: the implicit claim is “that it is right to recognize a prevailing
norm and that this norm ‘ought’ to have validity.”

•

Neither party casts doubt on the sincerity of the other. “A speaker is sincere if she
deceives neither herself nor others. Just as “truth” refers to the sense in which I
can put forth a proposition, ‘sincerity’ refers to the sense in which I disclose or
manifest in front of others a subjective experience to which I have privileged
access.” 83
Most of the time we communicate without any consciousness of the underlying

validity claims of our speech. But it is certainly possible to contest either the truth or the
normative rightness of an assertion. Truth involves grounding an assertion in experience
(or at least not being subject to a showing of contradictory experience). Normative
rightness, on the other hand, makes no claim against experience, but claims of normative
rightness can be considered universal only if all involved in rational discussion would
agree to their rightness “under ideal conditions.”84 Normative rightness goes beyond
mere empiricism – it “idealizes” a universal norm.
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Moreover, to Habermas, the linguistic turn in philosophy makes pragmatic what
had been Kant’s attempt to distinguish the “noumenal” or “transcendental” versus the
“phenomenal” or “empirical:”
The idea of the redeemability of criticizable validity claims
requires idealizations that, as adopted by the
communicating actors themselves, are thereby brought
down from transcendental heaven to the earth of the
lifeworld. The theory of communicative action
detranscendentalizes the noumenal realm only to have the
idealizing force of context-transcending anticipations settle
in the unavoidable pragmatic presuppositions of speech
acts, and hence in the heart of ordinary, everyday
communicative practices.85
In other words, when you make a statement about what ought to be, even in the most
mundane circumstances, you are claiming one kind of validity or another in what you
say. The test of validity of normative statements is not correspondence with facts in the
world, but with reasons that justify the universality of the claim, even if you have not
stated them.86 The process of argumentation and attainment of rational consensus around
either truth or normative rightness – the redemption of the validity claim – is what
Habermas calls discourse.87

Despite this revision, the concept of rational discourse retains its status
as a privileged form of communication that forces those in it to
continue decentering their cognitive perspective. The normatively
exacting and unavoidable communicative presumptions of the practice
of argumentation now as then imply that impartial judgment formation
is structurally necessary. Argumentation remains the only available
medium of ascertaining truth since truth claims that have been
problematized cannot be tested in any other way. There is no
unmediated, discursively unfiltered access to the truth conditions of
empirical beliefs. After all, only the truth of unsettled beliefs is open to
question – beliefs that have been roused from the unquestioning mode
of functioning practical certainties.
Ibid., 38.
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The kind of rational discourse in which a lawyer might parse language to the
extent that one expressly, rather than implicitly, warrants the truth, ought not to be the
presumed default state. We communicate as normal human beings; lawyers engage in
discourse, whether it is in the ex ante attempt to make communication precise, or in the
ex post exercise of figuring out what a communication meant. The lawyer’s exercise is to
predict the inevitable breakdowns in the “unavoidable pragmatic presuppositions of
speech acts.”
The half-truth is the most pernicious kind of lie, under this reasoning, because it
violates not only the warranty of truth, but the warranty of sincerity. The subjective
experience to which the speaker has access is the whole truth, yet it remains unspoken.
Discourse is not even possible, because we do not have a shared speech act as to which
we may jointly perceive the possibilities in which the proposition fails to mirror reality.
Even in the communicative action we must undertake to explain its breakdown and cure
it by discourse, we must presume sincerity. As Ayres and Klass observed about the
complexity of a speech act: “In most cases, a promisor’s representation that she intends

Habermas proposes an alternative theory of legal discourse that responds to the positivist-naturalist debates
over certainty and legitimacy in law. This is a theory of argumentation, much like Patterson’s: there are
many norms that may be applied in a particular case, and the argument, more often than not, turns on the
selection or interpretation of the norm:
[L]egal hermeneutics has the merit of having revived the Aristotelian
insight that no rule is able to regulate its own application. If we
consider a case to be a state of affairs falling under a rule, then such a
case is constituted only by being described in terms of the norm applied
to it. At the same time, the norm acquires a more concrete meaning
precisely in virtue of its application to a corresponding state of affairs,
which is thereby transformed into a case. A norm always “takes in” a
complex lifeworld situation only in a selective manner, in view of the
criteria of relevance prescribed by the norm itself. At the same time,
the single case constituted by the norm never exhausts the vague
semantic contents of a generalized norm but rather selectively
instantiates them.
Habermas, Beyond Facts and Norms, supra note , at 199.
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to perform does not require a separate utterance – ‘This casserole is sine cera’ – but is
understood to be part of the meaning of the very act of promising.”88 I contend it would
be a linguistically impossible act of schizophrenia to operate, even in the most
sophisticated, arms’-length setting, on the presumption that every speech act except the
one embodied in the language of the contract is potentially insincere.
Accordingly, the proper presumption for disclaimers of sincerity is that they only
apply to the extent they are patently and expressly clear, and then only in the narrowest
possible way.
b.

Disclaimers of Truth-Telling as Social Phenomenon
(1)

The Lawyer’s Constitutive View of Contracts

The position proffered by some scholars – that buyers should expect all
representations other than those warranted to be lies, and if the parties cannot obtain
satisfactory warranties and acceptable contractual remedies, simply decline to play the
game – captures a particular world view of lawyers and judges. It suggests a sharp divide
between the world of the legal and the world of the everyday that perhaps lawyers and
legal scholars perceive, but which seems to me self-deceptive or worse. What is a
mistake is to assume that there is some kind of guild-like code, some special language, to
which lawyers apply special magic to create precise rendition of the parties’ complete
agreement, apart from any common sense notions.89 Even more fundamentally, lawyers
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bring to the table an “inflated ‘rights consciousness’ that disrupts more flexible and
consensual extra-legal relationships.” 90
The presumption of the divide between the everyday and the legal seems to me to
be particularly lawyer-centric, and consistent with the way in which by licensing,
language, and culture, lawyers continue to maintain they are “different.”91 Austin Sarat
and Thomas Kearns have explored the everyday relationship to law, as against the way in
which scholars analyze law.92 They criticize both instrumentalism - a sharp distinction
between legal standards, on one hand, and non-legal human activity, on the other – and
the constitutive view – that law shapes (and reflects) society by providing the categories
and classification that make society seem coherent.93 In the deal context, legal
instrumentalism would be the idea that the documents are the means (and one suspects
the sole means) by which the deal gets done. Legal constitutivism would see the
documents as the deal. Vice-Chancellor Strine’s reflects a not-uncommon lawyer’s
constitutive view about the relationship of the contract language to reality itself: the
purpose of the anti-reliance provision is to “define those representations of fact that
formed the reality upon which the parties premised their decision to bargain.”94
This is the epistemological center of the constitutive legal view: if you do not like
a provision of the contract, you are entirely free to walk away. In castigating the Abry
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buyer for its attempt to circumvent the anti-reliance clause, Vice-Chancellor Strine said,
“The enforcement of non-reliance clauses recognizes that parties with free will should
say no rather than lie in a contract.” While this appeals to the Kantian in me, and might
well be true in highly simplified models of contracting, it sells short the complex social
structure that is a business acquisition. As Ayres and Klass recognize, even simple
promises, much less large-scale deals, are complex communications.95 It is a conceit to
believe either that lawyers are (or should be) capable of manipulating the parties’ myriad
understandings through language trickery, or that what they are doing in the drafting
session constitutes the whole of the speech act that is the transaction. CEOs speak to
CEOs; transition teams plan the integration of the businesses; pension experts value
assets and projected liabilities; labor negotiators deal with unions and works councils;
accountants and auditors work to create a pro forma set of financial statements for the
business, environment experts do sampling and estimate remediation costs, sales and
marketing personnel plot the way in which customers will be contacted. The reality (and
not necessarily the contract-negotiating lawyer’s perception) is that there is much of the
everyday going on, and that everyday activity is no doubt just as critical to the required
information-exchange in the transaction as what the lawyers are putting in the contract.

(2)

Contracts and Trust

Sarat and Kearns propose instead a far more nuanced relationship between the law
and everyday life, one in which attention to law is neither wholly explicit nor wholly
ignored – a kind of legal shadow in the background influencing the way parties conduct
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themselves.96 I suggest there is such a shadow in the law’s incorporation of the everyday
notion we do not lie to each other, even in contractual situations, and we do not deceive
each other by parsing meanings so finely as to create half-truths. The law of fraud forms
a kind of base condition, a safety net as it were, that makes concrete (even if it is rarely
used) this moral notion.97
If we proceed from a “state of nature” kind of model, why would a presumption
of lying ever be the default state? Lawrence Friedman uses the example of Tristan de
Cunha, a tiny and isolated island in the mid-Atlantic, as an organic society in which
implicit norms of behavior never had to develop into explicit rules of law.98 Friedman
suggests that while we continue to operate in our own small environs of Tristan de
Cunha-like non-legal normativity, a dispersed and complex society develops law. It
seems to me to invert how we develop to think that the language of the law would
presume lying unless there is an express warranty of truth telling.
The law has had a long struggle with reconciling the tort and contract actions for
misrepresentation; Vice Chancellor Strine recognized as much.99 Even at the height of
the freedom of contract doctrine, there were still significant restrictions on caveat emptor,
and the law of fraud as a separate action, even in a commercial context never
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disappeared.100 Moreover, Anglo-American law bespeaks a rational and litigious culture
in which consensus is less important than being right, so we try to reach the right answer,
instead of working it out like the Europeans do.101 Lawyers are general more rational and
formalistic than their clients, which is why there is never truly a caveat emptor business
acquisition agreement.102
While in a simple model (the sale of wheat in a first-year contracts hypothetical)
the contract may well constitute the reality of the deal (or model it so closely it is
essentially the same thing), in a business acquisition, the contract sits within (and, indeed,
perhaps at the center) of a far more complex web of trust and distrust relationship. It is
simply disingenuous to think the essence of the deal is being captured solely by lawyers,
with no other inter-subjective relationships. Recent work in the area of trust and the law
is instructive. Francis Fukuyama has proposed a matrix on which to plot the way norms
(including trust relationships) form – hierarchical versus spontaneous on one axis, and
rational versus a-rational on the other.103 Economics itself is the discipline by which we
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study rational but spontaneously-generated norms.104 Yet Fukuyama is skeptical of a
wholly rational approach to trust norms, and there is no reason to believe deal-makers are
wholly rational actors.105
The contract may reflect the deal but it is not the deal. In their study of trusting
and trustworthiness, Professors Ben-Ner and Putterman observed:
Especially when companies engage in business dealings
with one another, there are typically small numbers of
distinct individuals involved in the process, including
managers who work out the terms, lawyers consulted on
various details, and top executives who have to ratify any
major transactions. Individuals place not only their
company's, but their personal reputations for toughness,
honesty, and so forth, on the line as they deal with one
another on behalf of their companies. Telephone
conversations, face-to-face meetings, and handshakes occur
between flesh-and-blood individuals, and the usual cues of
reliability--reliability, that is, of the individuals concerned-are evaluated to form estimates of whether the trading
partner can be counted upon.106
Business people know intuitive that the contract will be incomplete, and resolving the
many issues, for example, that pop up once a deal is closed will depend on some
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW. Issues 2 and 3 of that volume were devoted to a symposium on the subject of
trust.
104
Id., at 487.
105
Fukuyama concludes:
Today there is relatively little exchange and even less consensus
across disciplinary lines concerning the question of norm genesis and
trust. Those who believe that the social sciences can achieve a unified
approach to the study of behavior tend to come out of the economics
tradition. For the reasons outlined above, I am very skeptical that this
kind of unity will ever be achieved. The social capital and trust
relationships we see in the real world are highly complex outcomes that
exhibit both emergent properties and path dependencies that were the
products of long-forgotten initial conditions. A game theoretic
approach yields many important insights into the circumstances in
which norms and trust arise, and for that reason is highly useful to
policy. But in other circumstances, we have to content ourselves not
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modicum of mutual good faith.107 Whether one approaches the concept of trust from an
economic perspective (i.e. that it serves to enhance efficiency by reducing the transaction
costs of the creation and enforcement of contracts),108 or from, what is for me, a far more
satisfying psychological, philosophical and ethical perspective,109 there seems to be no
real debate that trust is, in the words of Professor Bainbridge, trust is a “lubricant to
reduce social friction”110 in the deal context as much as any other.
Claire Hill and Erin O’Hara posit that the role of the law should be not necessarily
to encourage or discourage trust, but to optimize it.111 Their thesis is that legal scholars
assume trust to be wholly good or wholly bad, not recognizing or acknowledging that
trust and distrust can co-exist in the same relationship.112 Accordingly, the law should
create incentives to trust where more trust is beneficial, and discourage it where it is
not.113 An example of concurrent trust and distrust in a relationship is that of corporate
board to corporate management. Hill and O’Hara observe (correctly, I believe) that the
107
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relationship of board to management is not wholly one of monitoring (implying distrust)
nor of leadership and management (implying trust), and that regulatory incentives need to
be fine-tuned so as not to sub-optimize either aspect.114
Both the process and the substance of making deals reflect this concurrent
trust/distrust polarity. Parties regularly go forward with significant expenditures on nonbinding letters of intent. Lawyers cede drafting responsibilities, act as informal escrow
agents with respect to in-process documents, or take each other’s word. Indeed, as Ayres
& Klass note, contract damages are notoriously under-compensating.115 Making a deal
inherently means trusting the other party to some extent, because the legal remedies
embodied in the contract will almost never equal the expectation value of the
agreement.116 Or as Professor Seligman observed, “there is a connection between trust
and risk.”117 Precisely because there is no viable legal remedy, trust mediates “the risk
that is incurred when we cannot expect a return or reciprocal action on alter's part (which
of course we could, at least within certain boundaries, when interaction is defined solely
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William Sahlman, the dean of entrepreneurship scholars, has made the following observation about the
relationship of contract language to deal-making:
Often, deal makers get very creative, crafting all sorts of payoff and
option schemes. That usually backfires. My experience has proven
again and again that sensible deals have the following six
characteristics:
o They are simple.
o They are fair.
o They emphasize trust rather than legal ties.
o They do not blow apart if actual differs slightly from plan.
o They do not provide incentives that will cause one or both
parties to behave destructively.
o They are written on a pile of papers no greater than onequarter inch thick.
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by the reciprocally defined nature of role obligations and commitments).”118 Trust is the
completion of the incomplete contract.119
What then is the optimum default rule with respect to the construction of antireliance clauses? We can connect this exegesis on trust by returning to Professor
Langevoort’s discussion of half-truths. He proposes a sliding scale for half-truth liability.
Where there is little or no trust between the parties, he concludes, it is difficult to justify
the half-truth doctrine at all. But he leaves open how far the doctrine should operate in
negotiations marked by a higher degree of trust. 120 It seems to me clear: the volume of
communication in the complex deal setting entails some significant level of trust, with, as
Professor Langevoort puts it, “a broad half-truth doctrine, one with little privilege to
conceal once a matter is addressed at all.”121 It seems to me, then, barely a leap at all to
my doctrinal result: any disclaimer that flies in the face of this trust must be narrowly
construed.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The idea that the law governing business transactions should be wholly
predictable and certain adopts a scientific world view, and does not map onto basic
notions of either fairness or morality in every day life (as to which there is no evidence
that deal lawyers or their clients have disclaimed). What makes us moral is making
118
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Professor Seligman concludes:
Risk, as an aspect of social relations (no less than metaphysical doubt or mathematical
probability) has emerged as a constitutive aspect of life in modern society and trust as a
solution to this form of risk has, similarly, been its defining component.
Risk, I have endeavored to argue, became inherent to role-expectations when, with the
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an in-built limit to systemically based expectations (what we have termed confidence) of
role behavior.
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choices and not knowing the outcome to a certainty (this is Kantian) and the law does a
pretty good job of letting that happen, by building uncertainty into the system of
resolution itself. Because the ultimate determination whether we made the right choice
will be backward-looking and casuistic in every instance, determinations of good faith,
fiduciary duty, fair dealing can never be algorithmic. The principles are predictable, and
welfare-enhancing, only in the sense of there being some adoption of the rule of law but
not in the algorithmic resolution of any individual case.122
Vice-Chancellor Strine made a valiant attempt but ultimately failed to draw the
fine line in Abry (and recognized as much in a footnote of “intellectual candor”123).
Courts need not be concerned that the world of commerce will collapse if the threat of a
fraud claim hangs over deal participants, because the existence of some fraud remedy,
even if the impact is somehow to go beyond the contractual representations, in fact
reflects the way the parties do and should act. Accordingly, courts should give effect to
disclaimers of truth-telling, but should presume they are exceptions to the default state,
and hence construed as narrowly as possible.
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Appendix A

1
.

2
.

3
.

Contract Provisions
“Company A does not have
any unionized facilities.”
“There are no, and Buyer
disclaims any reliance on,
representations or
warranties, except those
expressly made in the
contract.”
Contract is silent on the
subject of unionization of
facilities. “There are no, and
Buyer disclaims any reliance
on, representations or
warranties, except those
expressly made in the
contract.”
“Company A does not have
any unionized facilities.”
“There are no, and Buyer
disclaims any reliance on,
representations or
warranties, except those
expressly made in the
contract.”

(v.2 Dec. 22, 2006)

Fact Situation
A company official said during
due diligence that Company A
did have a unionized facility.
The company does have a
unionized facility.
Company A official during a
management presentation says
that Company A does not have
any unionized facilities.

Contract Outcome
Buyer wins. Non-reliance
provision not relevant. Seller
wins only if the law or contract
imposes a rule under which
Buyer’s knowledge of the falsity
of the representation from other
sources negates reliance.

Fraud Outcome Under Abry
Unclear. Presumably the
knowing misrepresentation
element of fraud would be met,
but the non-contractual
disclosure should negate
reliance for purposes of fraud.

Comment
If Buyer were to make a fraud
claim post-Abry, why should
Seller get the benefit of a extracontractual disclosure to defeat
reliance?

Seller wins.

Seller wins. This is an
affirmative representation
outside the scope of the
agreement.

This seems to be a fair case to
allow the operation of the nonreliance clause.

The outcome will depend on the
interpretation of the word
“unionized.” Was it intended to
include an approved but
uncertified union as well as
established unions?

Unclear. If it is absolutely clear
to all concerned that “unionized
facilities” does not include one
in which the union has been
approved but the election has
not been certified by the NLRB,
then there can be no fraud,
because there is no untrue
statement. What is the
relationship of scienter to the
ambiguity of the original
representation?

The example demonstrates the
possibility of a half-truth, even
in what would have seemed at
the outset to be a simple and
clear affirmative representation.
A laissez-faire approach would
place the burden on the Buyer to
obtain the correct information
by asking the correct question,
or to create express liability by
requiring the correct and
complete representation.

The company does have a
unionized facility.
There are no other noncontractual representations, but
a senior official of Company A
knows that the workers at more
than one plant have approved
the formation of a union, but the
union election has not yet been
certified, and so technically the
company still does not have any
unionized facilities.

4
.
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Contract Provisions
Contract is silent on the
subject of unionization of
facilities. “There are no, and
Buyer disclaims any reliance
on, representations or
warranties, except those
expressly made in the
contract.”

Fact Situation
During a management
presentation, Company A
official says “Company A does
not have any unionized
facilities” but knows that there is
an organizing campaign going
on in one of the plants.

Contract Outcome
Seller wins.

Fraud Outcome Under Abry
Seller wins.

Comment
If an out and out lie is
disclaimed in Example 2, then a
half-truth, one supposes, is also
disclaimed.

“Company A’s financial
statements fairly present in
all material respects the
financial condition of
Company on the dates and
for the periods presented in
accordance with generally
accepted accounting
principles consistently
applied.” “There are no, and
Buyer disclaims any reliance
on, representations or
warranties, except those
expressly made in the
contract.”

Company A violated GAAP by
recognizing revenue out of cash
received from pre-paid
subscriptions.

Buyer wins. Non-reliance
provision not relevant.

Buyer wins. Presumably one
only misstates one’s revenue
knowingly.

What if Buyer has full access to
the financial records in due
diligence, but there is no “antisandbag” clause? Same issue as
in Example 1.
The point here is to show a
representation that is far more a
standard than a rule (in
contradistinction to the
representation on unionization.)

2

6

7

Contract Provisions
“Company A’s financial
statements fairly present in
all material respects the
financial condition of
Company on the dates and
for the periods presented in
accordance with generally
accepted accounting
principles consistently
applied.” “There are no, and
Buyer disclaims any reliance
on, representations or
warranties, except those
expressly made in the
contract.”

“Company A’s financial
statements fairly present in
all material respects the
financial condition of
Company on the dates and
for the periods presented in
accordance with generally
accepted accounting
principles consistently
applied.” “There are no, and
Buyer disclaims any reliance
on, representations or
warranties, except those
expressly made in the
contract.”

Fact Situation
Company A “stuffed the
channel.” This means that it
caused its customers to buy
during Quarter 1, even though
the clear expectation was that
customers would not likely buy
during Quarter 2, after the sale
of the company. This practice
does not violate GAAP, and the
sales were in fact all made and
properly booked.
During due diligence, officers of
Company A expressly denied
the existence of channel
stuffing, but refused to give a
representation on it in the
contract, on the grounds that “it
is too hard to define.”
Company A booked “return
reserves.” The standard for
“return reserves” under GAAP
is that they must be based on a
reasonable estimate of expected
returns. The CFO issued a
memorandum to all controller
indicating that it was important
for the purpose of the impending
sale of the Company that all
return reserves be in accordance
with GAAP, but nevertheless err
on the side of low estimates
rather than high estimates. This
had the effect of making the
earnings look higher. Company
A deliberately did not disclose
this memorandum in due
diligence.

Contract Outcome
Unclear. How does one
interpret the GAAP standard?
For the periods in question, the
financial statements do accurate
present the financial condition.
So a strict constructionist (or
Seller) will argue that this is
literally true. The unstated is
that to the extent Buyer is
relying on one quarter to look
like the next (even accounting
for normal seasonal variation),
Seller knows it is creating a
mistaken impression.

Fraud Outcome Under Abry
Presumably Seller wins because
as between a literalist
construction of the contract and
the fact that all the other
representations are extracontractual.

Comment
Now the issue as between intracontractual and extra-contractual
representations and reliance is
not nearly as clear.

Seller wins.

A strange outcome, but
presumably Seller wins, despite
the original sleazy practice of
pushing the envelope under the
broad strictures of GAAP and
the ensuing cover-up in due
diligence.

Isn’t the original representation
an assurance that Seller is not
playing games and telling halftruth outside the contract?

3

Does the original GAAP
representation create a partial
disclosure, the effect of which is
to create a duty of candor in the
due diligence? Does the burden
of disingenuousness fall on
Buyer or Seller?

If that is the case, why should
Buyer be limited to the remedy
inside the contract by the nonreliance provision?

4

